In the 21st century, the United States will increasingly rely on cyberspace to advance its national interests within a strategic environment characterized by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. Concurrently, our adversaries are afforded increased opportunities to undermine our efforts by conducting a broad spectrum of nefarious activities in the digital domain. While not all of their acts will pose a direct and imminent threat to the nation"s security, some will. Given these challenges, cyber strategists, government leaders, and scholars frequently disagree over whether the U.S. should establish thresholds (or red lines) for using military power when responding to hostile acts in cyberspace against government computer networks. This paper argues that delineating indistinct vice ambiguous or distinct red lines for hostile acts in cyberspace will better protect U.S. government networks and provide policymakers and military leaders ample flexibility to tailor response options in the same manner they are developed for threats in the other global domains.
ON THE RAZOR"S EDGE: ESTABLISHING INDISTINCT THRESHOLDS FOR MILITARY POWER IN CYBERSPACE
The United States (U.S.) will increasingly rely on cyberspace to advance its national interests within a strategic environment characterized by increased volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. 1 Just as cyberspace provides the U.S. an enhanced ability to realize its security and economic interests, the nation"s adversaries are also afforded increased opportunities to undermine our efforts by conducting a broad spectrum of nefarious activities in the digital domain. While not all of their acts will pose a direct and imminent threat to the nation"s security, economic well-being, or social stability, some will. Because of this, cyber strategists, government leaders, and scholars frequently disagree over whether the U.S. should establish thresholds (or red lines) for employing military power in response to hostile acts in cyberspace against U.S.
government computer systems and networks.
This paper argues that given the ever-evolving nature of cyberspace with a plethora of threat actors, U.S. interests are better served by delineating indistinct cyber red lines for the effective employment of the military instrument of national power.
Indistinct red lines differ markedly from distinct or ambiguous thresholds in that they offer a broad framework for applying military power in a measured way while maximizing the deterrence effect against U.S. adversaries. Indistinct lines also provide policymakers sufficient flexibility to tailor response options in the same manner they are developed for threats in the other global domains. To support these assertions, the scope of this paper focuses exclusively on thresholds for employing military power in response to cyber attacks against U.S. government systems.
The structure of this paper is as follows: first, background information defines cyberspace, select cyber operations, and primary threat actors. A brief review of national-level cyberspace strategies then provide context for the employment of military power and the development of thresholds. Next, ample discussion brings to light key capabilities of the nation"s Armed Forces, which sets the foundation for a thorough analysis of three red line frameworks (Distinct, Ambiguous and Indistinct). This paper concludes with a series of recommendations to senior political and military leaders.
The Digital Domain Defined: Key Characteristics and Threat Actors
Defining cyberspace and identifying cyber threats is a challenging endeavor.
Rapid technological changes continue to positively and negatively affect the physical and non-physical aspects of cyberspace causing this digital domain to evolve in many, often unpredictable ways. Cyberspace as the nation knew it in 1994 with dial-up access to the Internet is certainly not the cyberspace of 2012 with e-commerce, the Cloud, and
Facebook. Additionally, the availability of advanced technologies and cyber tools, coupled with ease of access to cyberspace give state and non-state actors an enhanced ability to conduct a full range of malicious activities that threaten U.S. government systems and the overall security and economic well-being of the nation. "When warranted, the U.S. will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as we would to any other threat to our country. We reserve the right to use all necessary means-diplomatic, informational, military, and economic-as appropriate and consistent with applicable international law, in order to defend our Nation. In so doing, we will exhaust all options before military force whenever we can; will carefully weigh the costs and risks of action against the costs of inaction; and will act in a way that reflects our values."
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In line with the ISC, the Defense Department published the DSOC, which acknowledges hostile cyber operations will be prevalent in any future conflict involving state or non-state actors. With this in mind, the strategy outlines five strategic initiatives.
They are:
 Treat cyberspace as an operational domain to organize, train, and equip so that DoD can take full advantage of cyberspace"s potential.
 Employ new defense operating concepts to protect DoD networks and systems.  Partner with other U.S. government departments and agencies and the private sector to enable a whole-of-government cyber security strategy.  Build robust relationships with U.S. allies and international partners to strengthen collective cyber security.  Leverage the nation"s ingenuity through an exceptional cyber workforce and rapid technological innovation. e. The theft of large sums of money that have the potential to negatively affect the nation"s financial standing.
Threshold Analysis: Why Indistinct Thresholds are Optimal
Determining the optimal threshold approach is fraught with many challenges since each framework possesses several notable advantages. To guide a constructive analysis of all three frameworks, the following evaluation criteria are used: degree of ambiguity, flexibility to tailor response options, deterrence effect, response time, and risk.
Distinct Thresholds. Distinct thresholds that delineate when and how military power will be employed following a hostile cyber attack have several advantages. First and foremost, distinct thresholds eliminate ambiguity in U.S. strategies and policies, which can dramatically reduce the time it takes to respond to a cyber attack. Distinct thresholds in essence become an automatic trigger for employing military power, which can be advantageous in the cyber realm where adversaries move at light speed and can quickly disappear. Distinct thresholds also maximize the deterrence effect against U.S. adversaries because cyber threat actors know there will be a military response.
This reality directly affects an adversary"s strategic calculus whereby they believe that there is more to lose than gain for taking a specific action that may be deemed hostile to the target state. Representative Jim Langevin (D-R.I.) likely sees the advantages of clearly stated thresholds. Following the release of the DSOC, he asserted that the U.S.
is too ambiguous with regard to how it will respond to cyber attacks. While the Congressman believes the DSOC and the ISC represented a good start, they were still deficient in several key areas including its fixation on the defense and the identification of acceptable red lines for a response in cyberspace. Finally, ambiguous thresholds keep the adversary guessing on how the U.S. will respond. As was brought out by one unidentified military official, "If you shut down our power grid, maybe we will put a missile down one of your smokestacks," 30 Second, with ambiguous thresholds, the time it takes to respond effectively with military power will be greatly increased allowing cyber adversaries to escape. Building on Senator McCain"s comments in the preceding paragraph, one of the most significant challenges for the interagency (IA) will be determining which government organization is the lead federal agency (LFA). This is no simple feat since there is much confusion about whether a cyber attack against government computers is a crime or act of war. If it is a crime, perhaps the DoJ or DHS will be the lead. If it is an act or war, DoD would lead.
Third, ambiguous thresholds, because they lack clarity, could erode U.S. between complete ambiguity and distinct red lines. The net benefit here is all government networks are more adequately protected, the American public reassured, and deterrence maximized because the nation"s adversaries know there will be a price to be paid for their nefarious acts.
Second, indistinct thresholds do not disclose fully all facets of U.S. cyber strategies. While indistinct thresholds guide the employment of military force, measured ambiguity will certainly keep the adversary guessing on how the U.S. will exactly respond militarily. An extremely important corollary here is that senior political and military leaders are still afforded flexibility to tailor how military power will be employed.
For example, a cyber attack by a terrorist cell that kills one, ten or 100 U.S. citizens will trigger the employment of military power; however, political and military leaders decide how such power is fused into a whole-of-government response. In one instance, (e.g.
the death of a single U.S. citizen), military power via CNE may provide intelligence that leads to the arrest of cell members. In another case where ten citizens die, perhaps CNA against the group"s computers and intelligence (derived from CNE) sharing lead to the take-down of the cell by host-nation law enforcement.
Third, the time for a military response is decreased significantly because there are clearly understood lines that trigger action by DoD and the interagency. Given military power will always have a role in a whole-of-government response removes or at least minimizes the "debate" that often accompanies IA deliberations on the military"s role. While IA discussions on using offensive military power will certainly still need to occur, knowing the military"s defensive power will be automatically employed will bolster cyber defenses, minimize the adversary"s cyber attack, and ensure networks recover more quickly thereby lessening the damage. In essence, indistinct thresholds help to streamline the IA process ensuring the timelier and effective application of the military instrument of national power following a cyber attack against government networks. is not necessarily a good offense; it is usually a good defense." 34 Critics would argue that indistinct thresholds are no better than the current approach (e.g. ambiguous thresholds) or an approach that focuses on creating distinct thresholds. Proponents of ambiguous thresholds would argue that any attempt to add clarity to response thresholds is untenable and could undermine U.S. credibility. For example, if an indistinct threshold states the U.S. will use military power to respond to a cyber attack that kills U.S. citizens, the first time this does not happen it will signal that U.S. does not mean what it says thereby diminishing the deterrence effect of the nation"s other capabilities. Meanwhile, pundits for unambiguous thresholds would argue that indistinct thresholds don"t go far enough in framing how military power will be used and that responses will eventually succumb to "red tape" in the IA leading to a time-late response. Both counterarguments are invalid because they fail to acknowledge that "defensive" military power is always in play and that regardless of the situation, DoD, either as the LFA or in support, can provide intelligence, bolster cyber defenses or deploy some other form of defensive power following the incident. While the nation or its adversaries may not overtly see its application because of classification restrictions,
The overarching conclusions presented above make it clear that neither distinct nor ambiguous thresholds for employing military power are optimal for the U.S. today.
Both approaches fall short in many respects and more importantly, fail to acknowledge that the world is neither black nor white but various shades of grey. Given this reality, the U.S. needs a different framework-one that fuses the positive aspects of distinct and ambiguous thresholds into a more balanced approach that allows for the timely, tailored, effective, and measured application of military power. As such, the U.S. will be better served in the long-run by establishing indistinct thresholds for employing military power in response to hostile acts in cyberspace against U.S. government networks.
In the 21st Century, the U.S. will increasingly rely on cyberspace to advance its national interests. Given the preceding analysis and to ensure the government is properly positioned to employ military power in response to hostile acts against government networks, senior political and military leaders should enact the following recommendations. , devoting approximately 75 percent towards defense will help ensure networks have the necessary resiliency and ability to detect an intrusion before it penetrates government systems. Maintaining a strong defense also allows other instruments of national power to take precedence over military options thereby minimizing the risk associated with using offensive military power. This defensive focus applies not only to DoD but the entire Federal Government.
Establish indistinct response thresholds

Expand DoD responsibility in the .gov domain. The overarching mission of the United
States Armed Forces is to protect and defend the nation against all enemies. Current authorities constrain DoD"s ability to accomplish fully this vitally important mission. By updating authorities to allow DoD an increased role in defending the .gov network will better secure not only government networks but the entire nation. Admittedly, the U.S.
public may perceive this as the militarization of cyberspace and a threat to civil liberties; however, given the global interconnectivity of government, public, and private networks in cyberspace, employing the full range of the nation"s military capabilities to protect the nation and its citizens is an imperative that cannot be comprised.
Increase cyber intelligence operations.
Given the nation"s growing reliance on cyberspace and the increased number of state and non-state actors, the Intelligence Community (IC) must increase intelligence operations designed to identify emerging cyber threats to government networks. While emphasis should be devoted to indications and warning, the IC must do a better job of sharing classified intelligence with all stakeholders, especially those that do not have mature classified networks. This is best accomplished by quickly declassifying intelligence and "pushing" timely and relevant classified information vice waiting for a request from another government agency on a cyber threat that probably has already penetrated the system. This proactive approach improves cyber defenses and allows political leaders to enact decisions on cyberspace in a timelier manner. Furthermore, it allows military leaders to develop appropriate, measured options for employing military power, prior to an adversary's cyber attack.
Future Research
Given the ever-evolving nature of cyberspace and the rather narrow focus of this paper, there is ample opportunity for continued research on this topic. Not fully considered is DoD"s role in protecting private networks from cyber attacks and the accompanying concerns over civil liberties. From an organizational perspective, the use of military power and DoD"s leading role in protecting all government networks calls into question DHS responsibilities for cyber security.
Conclusion
The 21st century strategic environment will become more and more grey owing to globalization and the impact cyberspace has on the dynamic interplay of political, economic, religious, and social factors in the international system. With a multitude of threats facing the U.S. both in the physical and digital realm, measured ambiguity via indistinct thresholds can serve as a powerful tool to shape the actions of U.S. adversaries in cyberspace. By establishing indistinct thresholds, the U.S. can bolster deterrence and give the nation"s leaders enough latitude to tailor effectively how and when military power will be employed following a hostile act against government networks in cyberspace.
